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ABSTRACT 
The objectives of this review were to evaluate economic techniques used to determine the cost 
and benefit of Listeria monocytogenes control and to estimate the economic optimum of L. 
monocytogenes food safety measures. The level of food safety measures is optimal if marginal 
benefit and marginal cost equate. Estimates of benefit and cost of L. monocytogenes food safety 
measures, from available published literature, are derived from different methods of economic 
analysis (willingness-to-pay, cost-of-illness, cost function, event study methods). The estimated 
annual benefit and cost of L. monocytogenes food safety measures ranged from $2.3 billion to 
$22 billion and from $0.01 billion to $2.4 billion, respectively. The estimated marginal benefit 
exceeds the estimated marginal cost, which implies that more food safety measures are warranted 
before the optimal level of L. monocytogenes food safety can be reached. However, due to 
considerable lack of data the optimal level of L. monocytogenes food safety measures could not 
be estimated. When better data become available, this study can serve as a template for 
estimating the optimal level of food safety. The understanding of the economic optimum of food 
safety level will contribute to designing a control program that is economical and acceptable for 
US society. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Listeriosis, a foodborne disease caused by the bacteria Listeria monocytogenes, is recognized as 
an important public health problem worldwide. Incidence of listeriosis in developed countries 
ranges from 4 to 8 cases per 1,000,000 individuals.[1] Due to its severe character, the 
hospitalization rate for listeriosis is 92% while the case fatality rate is 20%.[2] Almost all 
listeriosis cases (99%) have a foodborne source.[2]  According to Mead et al.[2], there are 2,493 
foodborne listeriosis cases per year in the USA, after adjusting for underreporting. The 
population groups most commonly affected by microbial foodborne diseases, including 
listeriosis, are pregnant women, neonates, the elderly and people with suppression of the immune 
system such as AIDS patients, cancer, or transplant patients.[3] Listeriosis may last from a few 
days to several weeks.[4] It can develop mild or severe symptoms. Mild cases of listeriosis are 
characterized by sudden onset of fever, severe headache, vomiting and other influenza-type 
symptoms. They may remain undetected by active surveillance. Although relatively mild in 
pregnant women, listeriosis may cause abortion or can be transmitted to fetuses/newborns either 
before or during delivery. Severe cases of listeriosis are often manifested as septicemia and/or 
meningoencephalitis and may also involve delirium and coma. Listeriosis may cause death in 
some fetuses, newborns and adults or cause developmental complications for fetuses and 
newborns.  
 
The genus Listeria comprises six species among which only the species, L. monocytogenes, is a 
public health concern. There are some indications, though, that L. monocytogenes subtypes may 
differ in their ability to cause human illness.[5] L. monocytogenes is a gram (+), psychrotolerant 
bacteria, which can survive and grow for a long period of time in many different environments 
including soil and water[6]. It can survive preservation methods such as the presence of high 
levels of NaCl (30%) or nitrite concentrations that are allowed in foods. Freezing and storage at 
–18oC, and even repeated freezing have little effect on survival of L. monocytogenes, and these 
conditions are more likely to injure than to inactivate this organism.[4] Contamination with L. 
monocytogenes has been found in many kinds of food.[7] The source of food contamination can 
be in almost any stage of the pre-harvest and post-harvest chain of food production. Entry of L. 
monocytogenes into food processing plants can occur through almost any route, including soil on 
workers’ shoes and clothing and on transport equipment. Furthermore, L. monocytogenes can 
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enter the processing plant through animals which excrete the bacterium or have contaminated 
hides or surfaces, raw plant tissue, raw food (meat, milk) of animal origin, and possibly healthy 
human L. monocytogenes carriers.[4] Moreover, the food contamination can occur at home. If L. 
monocytogenes is present in ready-to-eat (RTE) food it may cause listeriosis. That is because 
RTE food is, by definition, in a form that is edible without washing, cooking, or additional 
preparation by the food establishment or the consumer and that is reasonably expected to be 
consumed in that form.[8] 
 
The current US policy considers the detectable presence (≥ 1 CFU in 25 gram sample) of L. 
monocytogenes in RTE food to be a health hazard.[9] Regulatory agencies justified this, so-called, 
“zero tolerance” policy by limited scientific evidence that any number of L. monocytogenes 
could be consumed without at least minimal risk of developing listeriosis.[9] Nevertheless, 
increasing evidence has been accumulated that low numbers of L. monocytogenes represent no 
considerable health risk for the vast majority of consumers.[10] Because L. monocytogenes can 
reproduce at refrigeration temperatures, an initially low number of L. monocytogenes in food can 
replicate to levels that could cause an illness even in properly stored food. 
 
In the US, the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) of the US Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) is in charge of ensuring safe meat, poultry and pasteurized egg products produced in 
Federally Inspected Plants (FIP).[11] All other food products and egg products, after they leave 
FIP, are under the jurisdiction of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) of the US 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). The FDA and FSIS have unrestricted 
enforcement authority to selectively sample and test for L. monocytogenes.[9] The federal 
government performs nearly 7,500 tests for L. monocytogenes annually on processed meat and 
poultry products.[12]  
 
When a plant has reason to believe that the food products already in trade or in consumer 
channels could be contaminated with L. monocytogenes, the plant voluntarily recalls, i.e., 
removes the product from commerce to prevent the public from consuming adulterated or 
misbranded food (defined by USDA, FSIS[13]). If FDA and FSIS believe that a food product may 
be contaminated with L. monocytogenes they can ask the plant to recall the products. All recalls 
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of food related to possible or proven contamination with L. monocytogenes are categorized as a 
Class I recall. Class I recall is defined as a hazard situation where there is a reasonable 
probability that the use of the product will cause serious, adverse health consequences or 
death.[13,14] Among all foodborne pathogen recalls, Listeria is the most common cause of Class I 
recall.[13,14] 
 
While listeriosis has been considered a foodborne pathogen and a public health issue for many 
years, concerns about this pathogen and about food contamination with L. monocytogenes have 
increased considerably over the last 4 years. This higher level of concern about L. 
monocytogenes was triggered by a US multistate human listeriosis outbreak in 1998/99, which 
affected more than 100 people.[15] However, there are additional reasons for concern about this 
pathogen. Increasing demand for foods with extended shelf lives[16], which often allow and 
possibly favor growth of L. monocytogenes, and increased consumption of RTE foods in modern 
US society may provide a heightened likelihood of human exposure to L. monocytogenes. In 
addition, the population segment highly susceptible to listeriosis has increased and is expected to 
continue to increase.[17] To address these concerns DHHS and USDA jointly developed an action 
plan to meet the US President’s call for halving the risk of listeriosis by the year 2005,[18] using 
the incidence of 0.5 cases per 100,000 people from 1997 as a baseline. The presence of L. 
monocytogenes in many environments combined with its survival and multiplication capabilities 
make efforts to reduce human foodborne listeriosis a challenging task. In order to provide safe 
food for consumers and prevent listeriosis cases and deaths, significant resources are in use in the 
USA. As resources are scarce, they should be optimally allocated, i.e., to give the maximum 
benefits for the cost. Therefore, apart from being influenced by risk assessment, any change in 
strategy for controlling foodborne pathogens should also be supported by economic analysis. In 
this paper we explore the concept of an economic optimum of food safety measures, using L. 
monocytogenes as an example.  
 
The primary objective of this review was to evaluate published literature on the cost and benefit 
of food safety measures. Second, the estimates on costs and benefits obtained by different 
methods of analysis (e.g. willingness-to-pay, event study, cost function) were combined in order 
to provide both an estimate of the economic impact that L. monocytogenes food contamination 
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has on US society and the optimal level of L. monocytogenes food safety. The third objective 
was to construct a template for analysis of economics of other foodborne illnesses by comparing 
advantages and disadvantages of different methods applied in food safety economics and to 
determine possible directions in which different methods of analysis can bias the decision 
making process. 
 
II. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FOOD SAFETY MEASURES 
The concept of food safety encompasses many diverse elements. Safe food can be defined as 
food free from toxins, pesticides, chemical and physical contaminants and microbiological 
pathogens that can cause illness.[19] This paper is concerned only with the food safety related to 
microbiological pathogens, although the principles we apply are valid for other aspects of food 
safety. In this review the level of food safety achieved by a specific pathogen control program is 
assumed to be a complement of the corresponding risk of becoming sick, in a year.  
 
From an economic point of view, food safety is a food quality attribute that costs money. 
Although society benefits from greater food safety, the benefit (prevented losses) is believed to 
increase at an ever-decreasing rate as increasing levels of food safety are reached (depicted in 
Figure 1). In contrast, the cost of producing safe food is believed to increase at an ever-
increasing rate as food safety increases, also depicted in Figure 1. At any level of safety the 
benefit may be greater than the cost. However, that does not imply that safety should be 
increased, because what matters are marginal changes of costs and benefits. As safety increases 
there is a point (depicted as point A in Figure 1) where the benefit over cost of control measures 
is maximized. If food safety were to be increased beyond point A the incremental increase in 
cost would be greater then the incremental increase in benefit. This economic optimum is where 
marginal benefit is equal to marginal cost, and is depicted in Figure 2 at point A where marginal 
benefit and marginal cost curves intersect. It should be noted that this economic optimum is not 
necessarily socially, or even politically, acceptable. In this paper we considered only the 
economic aspects of food safety.  
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Figure 1.  Cost and benefit curves and the optimal level of food safety 
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Figure 2.  Market equilibrium determination of food safety 
 
The optimum food safety level is a static equilibrium, which may change each period for a 
number of reasons. Higher incomes can shift the marginal benefit curve up because consumers 
demand higher quality food, including safer food. On the other hand, the marginal cost curve 
might shift down because of technological change or new knowledge (e.g. if only certain L. 
monocytogenes strains can cause listeriosis there should be fewer recalls of food products).  
 
A perfectly competitive and well-informed market does not require government intervention to 
induce the optimal level of food safety. This is because the consumer equates the marginal 
benefit of each food product to its price and the competitive firm equates marginal cost to the 
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price.[20] When the supply and demand for each food product clear at a given price, the marginal 
benefit is also equal to the marginal cost. The appropriate role for the government in this case is 
to verify the producer’s claims on hazard content – not to regulate the level of food safety.[20] In 
an imperfect market where neither the producer/supplier nor the consumers are aware of food 
pathogen hazards, government policies will signal the health effects of substances in food to 
consumers. Nevertheless, even in a perfectly informed market, consumers may have a subjective 
belief about the hazard content of the risky food, and they may stick to their belief and be slow in 
adjusting to new information.[20] 
 
The food industry and the government carry the cost of food safety while the benefit is reflected 
in consumers’ public health. When analyzing food safety, we should bear in mind the 
interdependence between the cost and the benefit of food safety, the concept of socially optimal 
food safety level, and the role of government in inducing it. Benefits of a control program should 
not be evaluated without estimating the change they create in costs of targeted food safety level, 
and vice versa. Ideally, we want to estimate the entire benefit and cost curves because that will 
give us the best understanding of the economic optimum of food safety level for a foodborne 
pathogen. However, the approaches generally used will only identify one or at best a few points 
on each curve. That point is usually at the current level of observed food safety. One point would 
not even be that much of a limitation if we knew the slope of the curve at that point so we could 
get at least a local approximation of the curve. In the next section we review details on the 
usefulness of various methods for estimating data points on cost and benefit curves for foodborne 
diseases.  
A. Benefits 
Benefits are reduced losses related to illnesses and deaths prevented by the control program 
under analysis. There are five approaches developed for evaluating policy affecting health and 
safety. These are cost-of-illness (COI), willingness-to-pay (WTP), cost-effectiveness analysis, 
risk-risk analysis, and health-health analysis.[21] Only the COI and WTP approaches use dollars 
to measure benefits and are discussed below.  
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A-1. Cost of illness approach 
The COI approach computes the dollars spent on medical expenses and the dollars of 
employment compensation that are forgone as a result of illnesses or premature deaths. If these 
losses could be eliminated society would benefit. The COI computes the distance between the 
benefit curve and the absolute benefit, which would occur if food were 100% safe, as depicted in 
Figure 3. Thus the COI method does not estimate the height of the benefit curve but rather the 
distance from the benefit curve at the observed level of safety to the benefit level if food was 
100% safe. A limitation of the COI is that it only estimates one point (per observation period) 
and therefore is not able to provide the slope of the curve unless we assume the benefit curve is 
linear from the current to the 100% safe point. Knowing the slope of the benefit curve is essential 
in order to construct the marginal benefit curve to determine the optimal level of food safety. 
Another issue with the COI is that it does not incorporate the effort to avoid the disease or the 
discomfort suffered by the disease. Therefore, the estimate obtained from the COI is an 
underestimation of total benefits related to the foodborne pathogen control.  
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Figure 3.  Cost-of-illness method for estimating benefit of control policy 
 
Driven by financial needs and sometimes by company regulations regarding absence from work 
due to an illness, people tend to go to work although they do not feel well. Also, an illness might 
develop gradually while people are already at work. It is logical to assume that these people do 
not work as productively as they would if healthy. In a study on productivity decreases related to 
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absence from work due to illness, Brouwer et al.[22] estimated productivity losses before and after 
work absence from various causes. Because listeriosis can develop symptoms/situations similar 
to those represented in the survey conducted in this study (influenza-like type symptoms, 
headache, stomach/intestine problems, illness of family members), the results of this study are 
relevant for listeriosis. Analysis of the survey results demonstrated that absence from work 
contributed 86.3% in total productivity losses among employees who were absent from work due 
to illness. The rest, 13.7%, was attributable to lost productivity before and after absence from 
work. This additional loss should be taken into account if the productivity losses due to 
foodborne illness are based on the value of forgone or lost wages. 
 
Kuchler and Golan[21] state there are three disadvantages of the COI method. Primarily, the basis 
of COI’ theoretical legitimacy is the rather weak assumption that national income is a valid 
measure of societal welfare. COI equates the value of a life with forgone wages (higher paid 
members of society are assigned higher values of life). Secondly, COI is not always a good 
measure of disease severity because COI estimates are influenced by a number of factors other 
than disease severity, including the current distribution of income, education, employment skills, 
technological constraints to disease treatment, sick-leave policies, and health insurance systems 
(both private and public). As a result, COI estimates often move in the opposite direction from 
disease severity measures. Finally, direct medical expenses are often difficult to assess accurately 
because of the intricacies of insurance arrangements; human capital costs are equally difficult to 
ascertain because of the various forms of compensation that are available to employees. 
However, despite COI’s weakness as a measure of welfare or disease severity, COI does provide 
a measure of the economic impact of illness.  
A-2. Willingness to pay approach 
WTP measures the resources that individuals are willing and able to give up for a reduction in 
the probability of encountering a hazard that will compromise their heath. It is generally 
implemented by surveying people as to what they would be willing to pay for an increase in food 
safety from some current level of safety. Questions can be constructed to generate many points 
(each for a different level of food safety) on the benefit curve, providing an estimate of 
curvature. In addition, if the question is cast in terms of how much the consumers would pay for 
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an increase in food safety of some amount, then we have a direct estimate of the marginal 
benefit. The WTP is the true benefit curve. In contrast to the COI approach, WTP accounts for 
potential discomfort suffered by the disease and the effort to avoid the disease. The COI method 
underestimates the benefits of an increase in food safety because it excludes costs of averting 
behavior and discomfort costs associated with greater food safety (depicted in Figure 4). Because 
of this exclusion bias, the COI benefit curve appears to be higher than the WTP curve. As a 
result, with any increase in food safety the marginal benefit from WTP is larger than the 
marginal benefit from the COI estimate. However, once 100% safety is reached the COI benefit 
and the WTP benefit should be identical because there are no avoidance and discomfort costs.  
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Figure 4.  The relation between COI and WTP estimates  
of benefits of a control policy 
 
 
Although the WTP method is more comprehensive than COI, it also has disadvantages.[21] WTP 
reflects individual preferences for risk reduction where the demand for risk reduction is derived 
from expected health benefits. Because these quantities account only for expected (ex ante) and 
not for observed benefits at the moment of choice, they are not equivalent to realized damages. 
Secondly, WTP reflects the observation that individual preferences are unique and individual 
demands for risk reduction vary. However, because health and safety cost money, income 
differences rather than preferences will explain some of the variance in WTP estimates. 
Therefore, when benefits are calculated by WTP, policies may be guided away from programs 
that save poorer lives and toward programs that save wealthier lives. Furthermore, empirical 
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estimates of WTP have proved sensitive to the characteristics of the study population, the level 
of risk, and the type of risk. In practice, regulatory agencies that have adopted the WTP approach 
have generally adopted a single value for lives saved where the values have been derived from 
compensating wage studies.[21] Agencies apply this value to every health risk, regardless of the 
population likely to receive program benefits, the type of risk that might be mitigated, or the 
level of risk mitigated. Nevertheless, in spite of these limitations, WTP valuations represent a 
consistent and faithful application of the principles of applied welfare economics. WTP measures 
provide the best estimate of individual welfare available to economists.  
 
The WTP method requires conducting a survey in which respondents are asked to choose 
between two risks and decide how much they are willing to pay for the reduction of risk to their 
health.[21] A simplified pattern of survey questions could be to ask respondents how much they 
would be willing to pay for a food product considering the fact that the food could be 
contaminated with a pathogen at some probability level. They are then asked how much they 
would be willing to pay for a food with a treatment that destroys that pathogen at some stated 
probability. The questionnaire could have open-ended questions or a discrete choice format 
requiring acceptance or rejection of the reduced risk at a given cost. However, as stated by Fox et 
al.,[23] discrete choice questions correspond more closely to real-world situations because, for the 
majority of food purchases, the decision is either to buy or not to buy at the posted price. 
Respondents to the survey are often recruited from a student population at a low cost. However, 
that might be a source of bias since willingness to pay for a particular food under specific risk 
assumptions is very individual. Moreover, willingness to pay is restricted by the ability to pay, 
i.e. how much a particular person is able to spend on safer food. Students, usually young people, 
might be characteristically blasé about food poisoning risks; they often think they are immune to 
any risk. Additionally, their financial situation might force them to be less averse to risk 
compared to the rest of population. On the other hand, students might have a better overall 
knowledge of foodborne pathogen related issues. Therefore, selection bias introduced by 
respondents should be taken into account when designing a survey and analyzing survey results. 
The other problem with surveys is that respondents know they are evaluating a hypothetical 
scenario, and as affirmed by Fox et al.,[23] the absence of market discipline applied in the real 
world by budget constraints and the availability of substitutes make their responses questionable.  
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Recently, economists have developed experimental auction market methods, which can serve as 
a useful complement to surveys in estimating WTP. Compared to surveys, experimental auction 
markets use real money and real goods to create scenarios in which the participants give 
exclusive attention to the task under evaluation. This experiment might have several rounds of 
bidding for the same food product, which gives an opportunity to introduce additional 
information about the product being valued (e.g. a treatment that destroys or reduces L. 
monocytogenes in food) and to measure the effect of that information on the evaluation by 
participants. Nevertheless, the experimental method has disadvantages too, mainly higher costs 
per each participant, often double that of a survey.[23] Although results of experimental auction 
market methods have a more realistic flavor compared to surveys, they cannot be used solely as 
estimates of willingness to pay to avoid disease. They can and should be used as a valuable 
support of survey study results. 
B. Costs 
The food industry and the government incur the costs of a food safety control policy. The 
quantification of governmental costs was beyond the scope of this study. According to 
Feigenbaum,[24] total quality costs for an industry can be divided into failure costs (cost of 
recalled and destroyed products), appraisal costs (sampling and testing) and prevention costs 
(cost to reduce contamination), all depicted in Figure 5 as a function of food safety. Appraisal 
and prevention costs both increase as safety increases so they can be combined. Failure cost is 
not independent of prevention costs. As expenditures on prevention increase, it would be 
expected that failure costs would decrease. Likewise, an increase in appraisal costs, for example 
due to testing, may decrease failure costs. That is because testing should find potential 
contamination sources (food plant environment, raw material) before they lead to finished 
product contamination. Similarly, changes in food technology should shift the cost curves. With 
improved safety technology the failure cost curve will shift down because fewer products will 
need to be recalled. Figure 6 shows this as a parallel shift although the shift may not always be 
parallel. This is an important consideration because a parallel shift does not change the slope of 
marginal cost and then the optimal safety level. Appraisal and prevention cost should shift up but 
maybe in a clockwise manner as safety technology increases, also depicted in Figure 6. The 
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clockwise shift (holding failure shift parallel) means that the marginal cost curve falls at any 
level of safety and the new intersection of marginal benefit and marginal cost results in higher 
optimal level of food safety. In Figure 7, this is depicted as a move from point A to A’. However, 
if the failure cost curve shifts down in a non-parallel way, the slope of the total cost curve 
changes and the new intersection point could be in either the direction of lower or higher optimal 
level of food safety.  
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Figure 5.  Total industry costs of food safety 
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Figure 6.  Decrease in failure costs due to the increase  
in appraisal and prevention costs 
 13
$/safety
Safety
Marginal 
cost
Marginal
benefit
A A’
 
Figure 7.  Change of optimal level of food safety due 
to change in marginal cost 
 
 
Three methods for estimating costs of a control program related to the food industry can be 
applied. They are an econometric cost function for production plants, an event study method, and 
thirdly, the direct accounting cost at a specific level of food safety. 
B-1. Econometric cost function for production plants 
Estimating the cost function (cost of production) for a production plant where food safety is 
included as a cost determinant requires assessing the cost of a foodborne pathogen control 
program. Although we can sum or aggregate estimates for many firms, we usually estimate an 
aggregate cost function for the industry. Antle[25] demonstrated that product safety affects 
productive efficiency and costs, i.e. that cost of production is increasing with product quality. 
The cost function approach suggested by Antle[25] directly estimates the total costs curve (see 
Figure 5). The challenge is to quantify the level of food safety and then enter that as a variable in 
the cost function. However, Antle[25] did not quantify cost of safety in his data set. Instead, he 
used an indirect procedure from observed food prices because consumers pay more for safe food. 
This hedonic approach must be used if the food safety level cannot be quantified.  
B-2. “Event study” method  
The “event study” approach estimates the impact of a food safety recall on the firm’s net worth, 
which is the discounted net income of the firm. Future profitability may decrease because of 
 14
increased costs due to recalls of L. monocytogenes contaminated food, additional costs to ensure 
future safety, as well as lost future sales. There are a number of factors to consider when using 
this approach. First, if the analysis of total costs and benefits is to be expressed per annum, the 
estimate derived from the event study must be annualized since it includes both current and 
future net income. Second, the “event study” approach counts both income and cost where 
income is often lost sales. The limitation of the event study approach is that the losses a firm 
faces may not consist entirely of societal costs. The total cost or loss of one firm may result in a 
market gain for another firm with little or no social cost, or at least social cost less than the 
equity loss by a firm. If other firms make up for those lost sales then that income should be 
removed from the analysis, although consumers do suffer welfare loss if they can no longer eat, 
for instance, their favorite brand of hot dog. To quantify the impact of a recall on shareholder 
wealth, Thomsen and McKenzie[26] applied the event study method using daily security prices of 
food companies assuming stock market efficiency. If meat and poultry recalls do result in 
substantial firm costs, or adversely affect the future earnings of food companies, the impact of 
the recall will be reflected in adverse stock price movements.  
B-3. The costs at a specific level of food safety 
The third approach we can use is to compute the food industry costs at a specific level of food 
safety. Actually, this approach is the counterpart to COI, which estimates the public health losses 
at a specific level of food safety. This method accounts for the cost of products’ 
sampling/testing, product recalls and destroying products. Note that the value of destroyed 
products is a cost to the producer because products have to be replaced from the producer’s 
resources. The limitation of this method is the difficulty of obtaining the prevention costs. 
Therefore, this method underestimates the total cost of a specific level of food safety.  
 
III. COSTS AND BENFITS OF L. monocytogenes FOOD SAFETY 
MEASURES 
A. Benefits of L. monocytogenes food safety measures 
To estimate public health benefits of a L. monocytogenes control policy, the COI and the WTP 
methods can be applied. The COI method counts medical expenses attributable to all cases of 
listeriosis and forgone wages if people are unable to work. For that, all cases of listeriosis should 
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be counted. In a study by Buzby et al.,[27] updated in ERS/USDA Briefing Room,[28] listeriosis 
cases were categorized into those who did not seek medical care, those who visited physicians 
but were not hospitalized, and those who were hospitalized. However, in analysis they 
considered only hospitalization cases because only these data were available. Hospitalized cases 
were divided into those who recovered and those who died. Each group that recovered or died 
was categorized into maternal cases, fetal/newborn and other adult cases. Furthermore, other 
adult cases were categorized as to whether they developed moderate illness or severe illness. 
Only some of the fetal/newborn cases developed chronic disease, which resulted in mild, 
moderate or severe disability. Among fetal/newborn cases that survived, only those that 
developed chronic disability were counted as productivity losses. For the total of 2,298 acute and 
chronic cases, Buzby et al.,[27] updated in ERS/USDA Briefing Room,[28] estimated $0.072 
billion and $2.261 billion of annual medical cost and productivity/premature death loss, 
respectively, or in total $2.333 billion. This estimate represents a point on the benefit curve that 
corresponds to the current level of food safety and the distance to the total benefit line (Figure 3). 
Because we had the point estimate only for the current food safety level, we could not estimate 
the slope of this potentially non-linear benefit curve. Therefore we were forced to assume a 
linear benefit line that goes through the estimated point for the current safety level and the point 
that corresponds to 100% food safety and total benefit. Next, to estimate the marginal benefit, the 
COI benefit estimate was divided by the annual number of listeriosis cases in the USA of 
2,493[2], used as a measure of the level of food safety achieved by the current L. monocytogenes 
control program. Marginal benefit is estimated to be constant at approximately $0.9 million per 
each prevented listeriosis case (Table 1).  
 
 
Table 1.  Estimates of the annual and marginal benefit of L. monocytogenes control 
 
Method  
Annual benefit  
(billion ($)) 
Marginal benefit per 
Prevented Case 
(million ($)) Source  
COI 2.333 0.9 -Buzby et al.
[27] and 
ERS/USDA Briefing Room[28] 
WTP 11 - 22 4.4 – 8.8 -Hayes et al.
[29] 
-FDA/USDA/CDC[15] 
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It should be noted that the estimates obtained from the COI method underestimate the total loss 
related to listeriosis in several ways. These estimates do not include medical expenses related to 
mild cases of listeriosis that did not warrant a visit to the physician, or the visit to the physician 
did not result in hospitalization. Losses of productivity before and after absence from work are 
not included. Also, neither the discomfort that people with listeriosis suffer nor the effort spent to 
avoid the disease was included.  
 
The WTP method allows accounting of all components missing from the COI method. In order 
to estimate how much people are willing to pay for food safety, Hayes et al.[29] applied an 
experimental auction market method considering five foodborne pathogens: Campylobacter, 
Salmonella, Staphylococcus aureus, Trichinella spiralis, and Clostridium perfringens. Based on 
mean bid estimates, the average subject in their study would be willing to pay between a 15% to 
30% premium per meal to reduce the objective risk of foodborne illness to  1 in 100 million (this 
ranged across studied pathogens from 1 in 125,000 to 1 in 25 million). The authors stated that 
despite all the efforts to glean pathogen-specific information, results suggested that regardless of 
stated probability and severity, the average participant’s WTP for safer food is an indicator of 
general food safety preferences. Because the results presented in this study are not pathogen 
specific, we assume that they could be used for any foodborne pathogen, including L. 
monocytogenes. To estimate how much more people would be willing to pay for safer RTE food, 
we need the estimation of the current expenditure for RTE food. Because this estimate was 
unavailable, we utilized the data used by the FDA/USDA/CDC[15] on the annual number of 
servings of different RTE food categories consumed in the US. The fiftieth percentile of serving 
size for each of these food categories was multiplied with its market prices obtained from Bureau 
of Labor Statistics Data (BLS) of the US Department of Labor.[30] Calculated annual expenditure 
for RTE food was $76 billion. RTE food consumption reported in FDA/USDA/CDC[15] is 
restricted to the majority of RTE food that has been historically associated with contamination by 
L. monocytogenes. Furthermore, only some market prices of RTE food products were available 
from BLS. For all unavailable prices we calculated and used an average of those that were 
available. Therefore, our estimate of annual expenditure for RTE food is imprecise but is the best 
we could obtain from available data. From expenditures on RTE food we calculated that people 
would be willing to pay $11 to $22 billion more for food with 1/100 million risk of food 
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poisoning annually. This is the range that represents the possible distance between the benefit 
curve and the total benefit line at the current level of food safety (Figure 4). Because we know 
only one point on the benefit curve we could not estimate the slope of this possible non-linear 
curve. Therefore we assumed a linear benefit line to 100% food safety and total benefit. As a 
measure of the level of food safety achieved by the current L. monocytogenes control program 
we used the number of listeriosis cases in the USA per year[2]. From there constant marginal 
benefits were estimated that ranged from $4.4 to $8.8 million per each prevented listeriosis case 
(Table 1).  
B. Food industry costs of L. monocytogenes food safety measures 
As a result of the regulatory attention that RTE food products receive based on the “zero 
tolerance” policy for the presence of L. monocytogenes, a significant number of recalls have 
plagued the food industry.[31] The information on product recall may affect consumer demand for 
the product involved, which may lead to millions of dollars of lost sales as well as loss of brand 
equity. Furthermore, consumer demand for a product similar to the one recalled could decrease 
or increase, depending on whether or not consumers believe that these similar products are safe. 
In addition, Roberts and Foegeding[32] included plant closings and cleanup after recall, product 
liability costs and insurance administration costs. Facing huge losses related to a possible recall, 
manufacturers of RTE food products fear the consequences of L. monocytogenes in their 
products. Therefore, they attempt to eliminate the pathogen from the production environment 
through comprehensive cleaning and sanitizing, separation of raw material and processed 
product areas, control of employee hygiene and movement in production areas, and environment 
and food product microbiological testing.[31] These measures require extra work, cleaning, 
disinfection, alteration of production procedures and education, which all cost money. Some of 
these costs are reflected in changing stock market prices of the food industry.[26] The “event 
study” method allows measurement of the impact that recalls have on food-production firm 
equity values. Thomsen and McKenzie[26] studied the impact of a recall on shareholder wealth 
using daily security prices of food companies. Their results, based on 479 recalls from 1982 to 
1998, suggest that on average a Class I recall results in a 1.5 – 3% reduction in shareholder 
wealth. The predominant reason for recalls in that study was L. monocytogenes contamination. It 
is reasonable to assume that L. monocytogenes recalls do not differ from other food borne 
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pathogen Class I recalls and therefore, the results of Thomsen’s and McKenzie’s[26] study are 
applicable to L. monocytogenes recalls. To assign a dollar value to the reported estimate of 
reduction in shareholder wealth, we should multiply the 1.5% to 3% range with an average 
market capitalization value of all firms, or at least a random sample of firms, involved in the 
study. Because this information was unavailable to us we used the average firm market 
capitalization value of the 10 largest food companies in the year 2002. The estimated average 
firm market capitalization value of $15.9 billion was based on the following companies: Kraft 
Food Inc.; General Mills; Sara Lee Corp.; Kellogg Co.; Heinz; ConAgra Inc.; Wrigley Jr. Co.; 
Campbell Soup Co.; Hershey Foods Corp.; and Archer Daniels Midland Co.[33] From there, we 
estimated that the lost equity value to any of these firms of a L. monocytogenes recall may be as 
high as $0.24 to $0.48 billion. Based on Thomsen and McKenzie[26] there were 89 recalls due to 
L. monocytogenes contamination from 1982 to 1998, or 5 recalls annually. Assuming an efficient 
capital market, and a constant number of annual recalls in the industry, the reduction in equity 
value is the annualized costs of the recalls in present dollars, although the actual accounting cost 
impact in the future may be much greater than the current value of those discounted income 
streams. Therefore, the annual cost of all recalls related to L. monocytogenes may be as high as 
$1.2 billion to $2.4 billion (see Table 2). Within this range is a point on the cost curve that 
corresponds to the current level of food safety (Figure 5). To be able to estimate a slope of the 
cost curve we assumed a linear cost line to 100% food safety and maximal cost. The annual 
estimate of the number of listeriosis cases in the USA of 2,493[2] was used as a measure of the 
level of food safety achieved by the current L. monocytogenes control program. Estimated 
marginal cost per each prevented case of listeriosis ranged from $0.5 million to $1 million.  
 
 
Table 2.  Estimates of the annual and marginal cost of L. monocytogenes control 
Method  
Annual cost  
(billion ($)) 
Marginal cost 
per Prevented Case 
(million ($)) Source 
Event study  1.2 – 2.4 0.5 - 1 -Thomsen and McKenzie 
[26] 
-Yahoo!Finance[33]  
Cost at a specific 
level of food safety 0.011 – 0.021 0.004-0.008 
-Antle [25] 
-FSIS [34] 
-FDA [35] 
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It should be noted that the annual cost estimate could be biased in any direction. For example, 
this annual cost could be used as an upper limit estimate of an annual cost of all L. 
monocytogenes recalls, as it is based on the cost per recall for the 10 largest food companies. 
However, more recently reported annual numbers of L. monocytogenes recalls[13,14] are much 
larger than the 5 recalls used for estimating the total annual cost in this example. As detailed 
below, 70 recalls due to L. monocytogenes were documented for the US in the year 2000 alone. 
Furthermore, in their study Thomsen and McKenzie accounted only for recalls of meat and 
poultry food products reported by FSIS. Also, governmental costs related to control of L. 
monocytogenes are excluded from this estimate.  
 
While some food production plants lose because of L. monocytogenes problems, other plants 
may gain because of an increase in consumer demand for their products. Because the total 
consumption of all kinds of food products within the US remains stable, the only real loss due to 
L. monocytogenes for US industry might be the cost of preventing contamination and appraisal 
costs, and the loss of discharged products with associated discharge costs when a product is 
found to be contaminated (failure costs). However, the consumer might want to eat a hot dog of a 
particular brand but, because of an outbreak of L. monocytogenes, must switch to another brand 
of hot dogs or even a different type of food product, e.g. tofu. Therefore, in terms of cost and 
nutrition value, consumers’ welfare might be affected by switching to a different brand and/or 
type of food product. These costs are difficult to quantify and are thus generally not included in 
food safety cost-benefit analyses. 
 
We may also look at the cost of a specific level of food safety, such as the current recall policy of 
identified contaminated food. To account for the cost of that food safety level we have to 
combine the production cost of recalled products and all the costs related to the process of 
discharging (e.g. transport, storage while waiting for test results and cost of discharging). To 
count all recalls reported in the year 2000, we combined the meat and poultry recalls reported by 
the FSIS[34] with recalls of other food products reported by the FDA[35]. Although there were 70 
recalls in the year 2000 the amount of recalled products was known for 65 (for 5 the amount of 
recalled product was unknown) and these will be considered further in the analysis. In total, 
8,257,000 kg of food were recalled or on average 118,000 kg per recall. It should be noted that 
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35 recalls, regulated by FSIS, accounted for 99% of total recalled quantity, or 8,202,000 kg of 
meat and poultry products. Although, the FDA recalls were similarly frequent (40 recalls in the 
year 2000), they were much smaller in terms of the amount of product recalled. The question is 
whether the unit production cost for a product recalled by the FDA (e.g. the price of a sandwich) 
differs from the unit cost of a product recalled by the FSIS (e.g. a kilo of poultry product). Food 
producers keep production costs confidential. However, from Antle,[25] the production cost in 
poultry, beef and pork slaughterhouses and processing plants is between $1.32 and $2.54 per kg. 
Lacking specific information for RTE product production costs, we used these estimates to 
calculate the annual cost of L monocytogenes recalls. The estimated total cost of L. 
monocytogenes recalls was $0.011 billion to $0.021 billion (or $0.16 to $0.3 million per recall) 
in the year 2000 (see Table 2). Within this range is the point on the cost curve corresponding to 
the current level of food safety (Figure 5). Again, to be able to estimate a slope of the cost curve 
we assumed a linear cost line to 100% food safety and maximal cost. The number of listeriosis 
cases in the USA per year[2] was used as a measure of the current level of food safety. Estimated 
marginal cost per each prevented case of listeriosis ranged from $0.004 million to 0.008 million.  
 
An econometric cost function study by Antle[25] developed a model of quality differentiated 
production with quality control and estimated the possible costs of new food safety regulations 
(Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points - HACCP) being implemented by the USDA. For a 
90% prior safety level (i.e. 10% of products contaminated with any foodborne pathogen), 
Antle[25] reported that HACCP implementation might result in an increase of a total variable cost 
of 0.45 to 4.08 cents per kg. However, the value of 10% used in this calculation for product 
contamination with foodborne pathogens is higher than that found for L. monocytogenes 
contamination of RTE products.[15] An additional difficulty of using this estimate for derivation 
of the total costs attributable to L. monocytogenes control is that HACCP measures increase food 
safety for all foodborne pathogens, including L. monocytogenes. However, only a portion of the 
total HACCP cost is caused by L. monocytogenes. It is impossible to estimate either how big that 
cost is or how effective implemented measures are in eliminating L. monocytogenes from food. 
In addition, costs of some L. monocytogenes control strategies implemented by processing plants 
may not be HACCP related.  
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C. The impact of governmental costs on total cost of L. monocytogenes 
measures  
Government costs are believed to be an increasing function of food safety. The more inspectors 
take samples and test the food the greater the cost, but the greater the level of food safety. 
Marginal government cost should be compared to the marginal benefit function to give the 
optimum government expenditure for food safety. The costs borne by the government certainly 
have a significant share in the total societal costs of L. monocytogenes food safety. However, the 
challenge with the government costs related to L. monocytogenes control is the difficulty of 
estimating how much of the total employees’ time (wages) and/or resources is attributable to L. 
monocytogenes food safety. Therefore, we omitted these costs from our study, bearing in mind 
that our estimate of the true total cost related to L. monocytogenes control in the USA will be 
underestimated.  
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
Although the problem of L. monocytogenes control commences at the pre-harvest level, 
contamination is likely to occur at any later stage of the food production chain. Our study 
focuses on the post-harvest level of food production because interventions at that stage are closer 
to food consumption and have a stronger effect on L. monocytogenes contamination of RTE 
food. L. monocytogenes is ubiquitous and can enter the production chain anywhere and is 
therefore difficult to control. Because control costs money, the question is which level of food 
safety is optimal. In this paper we considered only the economic optimum of food safety, which 
is not necessarily socially or politically acceptable.  
 
To find the optimal level of L. monocytogenes food safety, ideally we need to know the entire 
industry cost and public health benefit curves. Unfortunately, most estimation procedures 
provide only one point estimate. To overcome the lack of points on cost and benefit curves we 
were forced to assume linearity of benefit and cost lines. The COI method of calculating annual 
public health benefits of the current L. monocytogenes control program gave an estimate of 
$2.333 billion[27,28] (Table 1). This estimate still underestimates the total benefits of the current L. 
monocytogenes program mainly because it does not take into account discomfort caused by 
listeriosis and the effort people are willing to make to avoid the disease. According to Hayes et 
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al.,[29] an average person is willing to pay 15-30% more for a meal with 1:100 million chance, 
compared to objective risk of food poisoning that ranges from 1:125,000 to 1:25 million. From 
the estimate of annual expenditures on RTE food of $76 billion (based on BLS[30] and 
FDA/USDA/CDC[15]), we calculated that people would be willing to pay $11 to $22 billion more 
for food that has an associated risk of L. monocytogenes food poisoning of 1:100 million (Table 
1), which is considerably (5-10 times) more than the $2.333 billion COI estimate. This high 
WTP estimate may appear to be implausible, but in a review of available information on the 
extent of foodborne illness in the USA by the US General Accounting Office, the WTP estimate 
for 1993 ($1.5 to $3.0 billion) was 15 times larger than the COI estimate for 1992 ($0.1 to $0.2 
billion)[36]. Although the COI method gives an underestimation of the true costs and losses of 
listeriosis, it is popular because it is easy to perform, and the reduction of listeriosis cases and 
deaths can be compared between different control programs. WTP gives a more accurate 
estimate as it accounts for all factors contributing to public health losses from L. monocytogenes.  
 
For food industry costs, the “event study” method[26] of the impact of a recall on shareholder 
wealth demonstrated that any Class I recall (including a L. monocytogenes recall) results in a 1.5 
to 3% reduction in shareholder wealth. Multiplying these estimates with an average firm equity 
value of the 10 largest US food companies[33] gives a value of annual recall cost of $0.24 billion 
to $0.48 billion or $1.2 billion to $2.4 billion annually (see Table 2). Although this method did 
not result in an accurate estimate of food industry cost due to L. monocytogenes recalls (as 
discussed in Chapter III-B), it still has a value. It pointed out the gaps in the current knowledge 
on the economics of L. monocytogenes food safety, which may direct future research in the area 
of costs and benefits related to L. monocytogenes food safety measures. Share market 
disturbances caused by food recalls are not very precise measures of recall costs as they depend 
on timing and the type of information that stockowners receive. Therefore, an estimate of direct 
costs per recall, which results from a specific level of food safety, might be useful, too. Due to all 
L. monocytogenes recalls in the year 2000, products ranging in value from $0.011 billion to 
$0.021 billion were destroyed (see Table 2). In terms of total food industry costs, the direct cost 
of a recall has limitations as it does not take into account the cost of discharging, and preventing 
and monitoring measures applied by the production plant to avert L. monocytogenes food 
contamination. A method that can account for total costs of food safety measures is a cost 
 23
function method. Antle[25] estimated that measures implemented by HACCP cause an increase in 
total variable cost of 0.45 to 4.08 cents per kg of product. But HACCP aims to control all 
foodborne pathogens in food, including L. monocytogenes and it is impossible to isolate the 
portion of total HACCP costs relevant to L. monocytogenes. The difficulty in separating total 
costs related to L. monocytogenes from those attributable to other foodborne pathogens leaves 
two available estimates for food industry costs of L. monocytogenes. These are an estimate of the 
change in shareholder wealth as a consequence of a L. monocytogenes recall, and an estimate of 
the direct cost of a recall. Despite the large market capitalization value (based on market 
capitalization value of the 10 largest food producers) used for estimating the change in 
shareholder wealth as a consequence of a L. monocytogenes recall, the range that these two 
estimates probably represent is the lower bound estimate of total food industry costs related to L. 
monocytogenes. Furthermore, this range is an underestimation of total societal costs because it 
does not account for the important costs borne by the government. The upper bond of total 
societal cost due to L. monocytogenes control and the slope of marginal cost remain unknown. 
 
Estimated marginal benefit exceeds estimated marginal cost, which leads to the conclusion that 
more food safety measures, i.e., a higher food safety level, are warranted. However, we have no 
knowledge concerning how much higher food safety level would be optimal, because we were 
forced to assume linear marginal curves from the current level of food safety. Interestingly, the 
upper bound estimate of marginal cost overlaps with the COI estimate of marginal benefit. The 
fact that our estimates of cost underestimate the true cost indicates that an even larger overlap 
between the marginal benefit and cost is possible, which could be interpreted in favor of under 
investment in food safety. However, it should be recognized that the COI method strongly 
underestimates the benefit of L. monocytogenes food safety measures. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first attempt at combining all the available 
knowledge on the costs and benefits of L. monocytogenes control. Also, we are not aware of any 
study that has tried to determine the economic optimum of L. monocytogenes food safety 
measures for US society. Estimates of the total societal cost and benefit that were extrapolated 
from available literature on L. monocytogenes did not provide us with enough information to 
construct the cost and the benefit curves. Therefore, the level of L. monocytogenes food safety 
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that would be optimal for US society, from an economic point of view, cannot be determined. 
The gaps in the knowledge on the costs and benefits of L. monocytogenes food safety control 
identified in this study might serve as directions for future economic analysis and will help in 
shaping rational approaches to define and assure a safe and affordable food supply.  
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The biology of the pathogen L. monocytogenes makes the goal of total L. monocytogenes 
elimination from food unrealistic. The level of L. monocytogenes food safety we should aim for 
will be the one that the consumers will be willing to pay, equated to the incremental cost of 
providing that level of safety. To determine the optimal level of food safety requires estimating 
the cost and benefit curves and then determining the marginal increase in benefits and costs for 
various increases in safety. For an economic optimum of food safety level, marginal benefit 
should equate to marginal cost. In addition, social and political issues obviously need to be 
considered when determining an acceptable level of food safety. 
 
We reviewed available published literature on the economics of L. monocytogenes food safety 
measures and critically analyzed reported results and the methods applied to estimate the costs 
and losses related to L. monocytogenes. Our findings are structured in such a way to serve as a 
future reference for the economic analysis of both L. monocytogenes and other foodborne 
pathogens. To the best of our knowledge a systematic economic analysis of the total societal 
costs and losses and estimation of an optimal level of food safety has not been conducted for L. 
monocytogenes or for any other foodborne pathogen to date. Therefore, we believe that our work 
contributes to the overall knowledge of the economics of foodborne pathogens and has a special 
value in making decisions and plans related to future L. monocytogenes control and research.  
 
Our study demonstrates how incomplete the current knowledge is regarding the specific points 
and slopes of both the cost and benefit curves of food safety. Therefore, future studies of the 
economics of L. monocytogenes should be designed to provide estimates of total societal costs 
and benefits. From there, the level of food safety that is optimal for US society can be 
determined. The understanding of the optimal food safety level will contribute to designing an 
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alternative L. monocytogenes control program that would be the most effective and economic, 
but at the same time acceptable for US society.  
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